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Abstract
I construct a model in which money and bond holdings are consistent with
individual decisions and aggregate variables such as production and interest
rates. The agents are inﬁnitely-lived, have constant-elasticity preferences, and
receive a fraction of their income in money. Each agent solves a Baumol-Tobin
money management problem. Markets are segmented because ﬁnancial frictions
make agents trade bonds for money at diﬀerent times. Trading frequency,
consumption, government decisions and prices are mutually consistent. An
increase in inﬂation, for example, implies higher trading frequency, more bonds
sold to account for seigniorage, and lower real balances.
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11. Introduction
Aggregate variables such as the money-income ratio depend on individual decisions.
Here, I combine the general equilibrium Baumol-Tobin models of Jovanovic (1982)
and Romer (1986) with the market segmentation models of Grossman and Weiss
(1983), Rotemberg (1984), and Grossman (1987) to connect individual decisions to
variables used in monetary policy. The objective is to create a framework to analyze
consumption, prices, and money taking into account the changes in the individual
demands for money.
I use two features from the models above. I obtain the demands for money from
an inventory model of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) in general equilibrium, as Jo-
vanovic and Romer (other general equilibrium Baumol-Tobin models are in Fusselman
and Grossman 1989, Heathcote 1998, Chiu 2007, and Rodriguez-Mendizabal 2006).
And I express individual optimization problems as in the market segmentation models
of Grossman and Weiss, and Rotemberg. As a result, agents trade bonds for money
at diﬀerent times, now with the trading frequency obtained in equilibrium.
In addition to combining the two frameworks, I make two changes from the models
above. First, the model has inﬁnitely-lived agents and consumption smoothing while
Jovanovic assumes constant consumption and Romer assumes zero intertemporal dis-
count and overlapping generations. I consider consumption smoothing because it
aﬀects the demand for money and the welfare cost of inﬂation. Inﬁnite-lived agents,
on the other hand, remove the inﬂuence of the length of life of each generation on
equilibrium variables. In particular, consumption and money over time after policy
changes are not aﬀected by the length of each generation. Inﬁnite lives and consump-
tion smoothing, moreover, facilitate comparison with cash-in-advance models such as
the models of Lucas and Stokey (1987), and Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991).
Second, I let agents receive a fraction of income in money within holding periods. I
2allow a fraction of income in money because market segmentation implies large holding
periods to match data on velocity (Edmond and Weill 2008), holding periods of six
months or larger. As traditional Baumol-Tobin models implicitly assume that agents
receive their income in interest-bearing bonds (Karni 1973), large holding periods
would make agents separated from their income for a long period. Therefore, I follow
Alvarez et al. (2009) and Khan and Thomas (2010) and assume that agents receive
part of their income in bonds and the remaining in money. The fraction of income
in money is thought to be substantial, sixty percent for example, and interpreted as
labor income.
The result is a monetary model in which trading periods, consumption and the
distribution of money holdings are consistent with individual decisions and aggregate
variables. An increase in inﬂation, for example, implies higher trading frequency,
more bonds sold to account for seigniorage, and lower real balances. Silva (2009,
forthcoming) uses the model to study the eﬀects of interest rate shocks and the
welfare cost of inﬂation. Even with the modiﬁcations made here, the model allows its
steady state to be characterized analytically.
Having the frequency of trades chosen optimally, as in the model, implies a better
ﬁt with the data on money and interest rates. The demand for money, for example,
has an interest elasticity of −0.5 and semi-elasticity of −12.5. The interest elastic-
ity is approximately zero, in contrast, with ﬁxed holding periods (Romer 1986 and
Grossman 1987). The choice of the interval between trades makes easier for agents
to change their demand for money.
2. The Model
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents with measure one. There is an asset
market and a goods market. The asset market concentrates trades between bonds
and money and the goods market concentrates the trades between goods and money.
3Only money can be used to buy goods. The government sets government consumption
and taxes and controls the supply of money through open market operations.
The ﬁnancial frictions appear when agents transfer resources between the asset
market and the goods market. Each agent has a brokerage account and a bank
account, as in Alvarez et al. (2002, 2009). The brokerage account is used to manage
the activities in the asset market and the bank account to manage the activities in the
goods market. The ﬁnancial frictions are represented by a transfer cost Γ in real terms
that the agents need to pay whenever they transfer resources between the brokerage
account and the bank account. The transfer cost is paid with the resources in the
brokerage account and it does not depend on the volume transferred. Γ represents a
ﬁxed cost of portfolio adjustment.
Time is continuous, t ≥ 0. Time is continuous to avoid integer constraints on
the decision of the time to make transfers. At t =0 , each agent has M0 in money
in the bank account and B0 in bonds in the brokerage account. There is a given
distribution F of M0 and B0. Index agents by their initial holdings of money and
bonds, s =( M0,B 0).
Each agent is composed of three participants, a worker, a trader, and a shopper,
as in Lucas (1990). At the beginning of each period, the worker engages in the
production and sales of the consumption good, the trader goes to the asset market
to manage the brokerage account, and the shopper goes to the goods market to buy
consumption goods. At the end of each period, the three participants rejoin to share
the consumption good.
The ﬂo wo ff u n d so c c u r si nt h ef o l l o w i n gw a y . T h ew o r k e rp r o d u c e sY (t) goods
and sells the production for money to other agents in the goods market by the price
P (t). After the sale, the worker transfers aP (t)Y (t) to the bank account and
(1 − a)P (t)Y (t) to the brokerage account. The trader trades bonds and money
with the resources of the brokerage account. The trades can be made with other
4traders or with the government in open market operations. If it is necessary to make
a transfer from the brokerage account to the bank account, the trader sells the neces-
sary quantity of bonds and makes the transfer. In the same way, the trader can make
transfers from the bank account to the brokerage account. As the money deposited
in the brokerage account cannot be used to buy goods and does not receive interest,
the money in the brokerage account is immediately used to buy bonds. The shopper
u s e st h ea v a i l a b l em o n e yi nt h eb a n ka c c o u n tt ob u yg o o d si nt h eg o o d sm a r k e t .
The shopper then brings the goods purchased to the other participants to be shared
among then in the end of the period.
In Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), the agents have access to money only when
they pay the ﬁnancial costs to convert bonds into money. This case is obtained here
with a =0 . Then, all sales are converted into bonds and the shopper can only use
the sales proceeds to buy goods after a transfer from the brokerage account to the
bank account. The introduction of a fraction a>0 allows the shopper to use part of
the sales proceeds immediately. To simplify, the transfers of the worker to the trader
and to the shopper do not pay the ﬁnancial costs. Only the transfers between the
brokerage account and the bank account pay the ﬁnancial costs.
Agent s decides consumption c(t,s),t h et i m e st om a k et r a n s f e r sTj (s), j =1 ,2,...,
money and bond holdings in the bank and brokerage account, M(t,s), B(t,s),a n d
the transfers of money between the two accounts, z (t,s). The worker, the trader, and
the shopper are together represented as agent s.L e tT0 (s) ≡ 0. T0 is not a decision
variable. If an agent decides to make the ﬁrst transfer at t =0 ,t h e nT1 (s)=0 .A
holding period is given by (Tj,T j+1).
Let r(t) denote the nominal interest rate at time t.I ft h e r ei sn o tat r a n s f e ra tt,
bond holdings in the brokerage account evolve as
˙ B (t,s)=r(t)B (t)+( 1− a)P (t)Y (t), t ≥ 0, t 6= T1 (s),T 2 (s),...,( 1 )
5where ˙ x is the derivative of x with respect to time. If there are no transfers, the agent
simply accumulates the interest rate and the income from sales. Bond holdings in the
brokerage account increase.
Let B− (Tj (s),s) represent bond holdings just before a transfer at t = Tj and
B+ (Tj (s),s) represent bond holdings just after the transfer, B− (Tj (s),s) ≡ limt→Tj,
t<TjB(t,s) and B+ (Tj (s),s) ≡ limt→Tj,t>Tj B (t,s).A tt = Tj, the constraint on the
brokerage account is
z (Tj (s),s)+P (Tj (s))Γ = B
− (Tj (s),s)−B
+ (Tj (s),s), t = T1 (s),T 2 (s),... (2)
If there is a positive transfer to the bank account, z (Tj (s),s) > 0,t h e nB−(Tj (s),s)
>B +(Tj (s),s). In this case, bond holdings in the brokerage account decrease just
after the transfer.
Money holdings in the bank account follow
˙ M (t,s)=−P (t)c(t,s)+aP (t)Y (t), t ≥ 0, t 6= T1 (s),T 2 (s),...,( 3 )
during a holding period. If there are no transfers, money holdings decrease with goods
purchases and increase with the income transfers from sales. The shopper can use the
money transferred from the worker to buy goods in the same period. Analogously
to the deﬁnitions for bond holdings, let M+ (Tj (s),s) and M− (Tj (s),s) denote
money holdings just after a transfer and money holdings just before a transfer. We
have z (Tj (s),s)=M+ (Tj (s),s) − M− (Tj (s),s). If the transfer is positive then
M+ (Tj (s),s) − M− (Tj (s),s) > 0. When there is a transfer,
˙ M (Tj (s),s)
+ = −P (Tj)c
+ (Tj (s),s)+aP (t)Y (t), t ≥ 0, t = T1 (s),T 2 (s),...,
(4)
where ˙ M (Tj (s),s)
+ is the right derivative of M (t,s) with respect to time at t = Tj (s)
6and c+ (Tj (s),s) is consumption just after the transfer. Notice that the government
does not distribute money directly to agents with, for example, lump-sum transfers.
Only those agents in the asset market, trading bonds for money, have access to the
transfers of money from the government.
T h ea g e n t sm a k et r a n s f e r ss ot h a tM+ (Tj (s),s) covers the purchases during (Tj,








aP (t)Y (t)dt + M
− (Tj+1 (s),s),
(5)
j =1 ,2,...Agent s =( M0,B 0) starts with M0 in money holdings at t =0 . The agent








aP (t)Y (t)dt + M
− (T1 (s),s).( 6 )
It can be the case that the agent chooses to make the ﬁrst transfer at t =0 .F o r
example, if a =0and M0 =0 . In this case, T1 (s)=0 ,a n dM− (0,s)=0 .
Let Q(t) denote the price at time zero of a bond that pays one dollar at time t.
Given the nominal interest rate r(t), Q(t)=e−R(t),w h e r eR(t)=
R t
0 r(τ)dτ.U s i n g
(1), Q(Tj+1)B− (Tj+1)=Q(Tj)B+ (Tj)+
R Tj+1
Tj Q(t)(1− a)PY (t)dt. Substituting
for the diﬀerent holding periods, together with the condition limt→∞ Q(t)B (t)=0 ,
we obtain the constraint on the brokerage account in present value,
∞ X
j=1
Q(Tj (s))[z (Tj (s),s)+P (Tj (s))Γ] ≤
Z ∞
0
Q(t)(1− a)P (t)Y (t)+B0,( 7 )
where z (Tj (s),s)=M+ (Tj (s),s) − M− (Tj (s),s).








subject to (3)-(7) and to Tj+1 (s) ≥ Tj (s) and M (t,s) ≥ 0. ρ is the intertemporal
rate of discount. The utility function is u(c)=c1−1/η
1−1/η, η 6=1 , η > 0;a n du(c)=l o gc,
η =1 . The transfer cost does not enter in the utility function. η is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.
It is never optimal to set M− (Tj+1) > 0, j ≥ 1. M− (Tj+1) > 0 means that
the agent maintained money holdings in the bank account during the whole holding
period (Tj,T j+1) without receiving interest. The agent is always better oﬀ reducing
the amount transferred at Tj, M+ (Tj+1),u n t i lM− (Tj+1)=0 . A sa g e n t sc a n n o t
change M0, it can still be the case that M− (T1) > 0. For the other holding periods,
M− (Tj+1)=0 . Therefore, using (3), the demand for money at t of agent s is given
by M (t,s)=
R Tj+1(s)
t [P (t)c(t,s) − aP (t)Y (t)]dt, Tj (s) ≤ t<T j+1 (s), j ≥ 1.
The transfer cost rules out an equilibrium with a representative agent. In a standard
cash-in-advance model, agents have access to bonds and to their income in the end of
every period. Here, agents have access to their bonds and to their income deposited
in bonds only when they sell bonds for money. At every moment, some agents sell
part of their bonds for money and make a transfer while others accumulate bonds
and keep using money in the bank account until the next transfer.
T om a k et h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t sl i n e a ri ni n c o m e ,l e tΓ = γY (t). As preferences
are homothetic, this implies that optimal consumption and that the demand for
money are linear in income. A demand for money linear in income, that is, income
elasticity equal to one, agrees with the empirical evidence as discussed, among others,
by Meltzer (1963), Lucas (2000).
Let BG
0 denote the supply of government bonds at t =0 .C o n s i d e rﬁrst a situation
8with no taxes and no government consumption. In this case, all seigniorage collected






P(t)dt,w h e r eM (t) is the aggregate money supply.
Higher money growth implies higher BG
0 and more bonds distributed across agents.






B0 (s)dF (s). The market clearing condition for goods takes into account
the goods used to pay the transfer cost. Let A(t,δ) ≡ {s : Tj (s) ∈ [t,t + δ]} denote
the set of agents that make a transfer during [t,t + δ]. The number of goods during




δΓdF (s). Taking the limit to
obtain the number of goods used at time t yields that the market clearing condition
for goods is given by
R





An equilibrium is deﬁned as prices P (t), Q(t), allocations c(t,s), M (t,s),t r a n s f e r
times Tj (s), j =1 ,2,..., and a distribution of agents F such that (i) c(t,s), M (t,s),
and Tj (s) solve the maximization problem (8) given P (t) and Q(t) for all t ≥ 0 and s
in the support of F; (ii) the government budget constraint holds; and (iii) the market
clearing conditions for money, bonds, and goods hold.
Solving the model
Focus on the steady state, an equilibrium in which the nominal interest rate is
constant at r,t h ei n ﬂa t i o nr a t ei sc o n s t a n ta tπ, and aggregate consumption grows
a tt h es a m er a t eo fo u t p u t .L e to u t p u tg r o wa tt h er a t eg, Y (t)=Y0egt,w h e r eρ >
g(1 − 1/η). I look for an equilibrium in which all agents have the same consumption
pattern within holding periods and the same interval between transfers N.T h e
steady state is interpreted as the allocations and prices of an economy that has not
been exposed to shocks for a long time.
Rewrite the maximization problem in terms of the consumption-income ratio ˆ c(t,n)
≡ c(t,n)/Y (t). ˆ c(t,n) decreases at a constant rate within holding periods, according
to r and η.W ec a nt h e nw r i t eˆ c(t,n) for the entire holding period as a function of its
9value at the beginning of a holding period. With the exception of the short holding
period from t =0to the ﬁrst transfer, let the steady state be such that all agents
begin a holding period with the same consumption-income ratio, ˆ c0.
At a certain time t, ˆ c(t,n) varies across agents because each agent is in a diﬀerent
position in the holding period. But all agents look the same within holding periods.
They start with the same consumption-income ratio and it decreases at a common
rate. As the maximization problem can be written in terms of the consumption-
income ratio, having the same ˆ c0 implies that all agents choose the same interval
between transfers N.L e t n r e p r e s e n tt h et i m eo ft h eﬁrst transfer, n ∈ [0,N).
Therefore, an agent n makes transfers at n, n + N and so on.
As aggregate consumption grows at the same rate of aggregate output, the same
number of agents must be starting a new holding period at every time. Otherwise,
aggregate consumption would vary over time. As a result, the distribution of agents
is uniform along [0,N),w i t hd e n s i t y1/N.1
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to consumption implies c(t,n)= e−(ρ+π)ηt
[P0Q(Tj)λ(n)]η,
t ∈ (Tj,T j+1), j =1 ,2,...,u s i n gP (t)=P0eπt,a n dw h e r eλ(n) is the Lagrange
multiplier of (7). Set the nominal interest rate in the steady state at r = ρ+g/η+π.
The ﬁrst order condition then implies ˙ c(t,n)/c(t,n)=−ηr + g and that ˆ c(t,n)
decreases at the rate ηr.
If η, r or a are high, then agents would consume more in the beginning of holding
periods by borrowing against their money receipts within the same holding period.
They would consume less than aY in the end of a holding periods. A useful property
of the model is that c>a Y for the empirically relevant range of η, r,a n da.T h a t
is, for η between zero and ﬁve, r between zero to 16% per year, and a ≤ 0.6.T h i s
is the empirically relevant range of η, r,a n da because the usual estimates of η are
1For a proof that the only distribution of agents compatible with a steady state in which agents
have the same consumption pattern is the uniform distribution, see Grossman (1985). Grossman
(1985, 1987) study the eﬀects of monetary policy changes in a model with N ﬁxed.
10below ﬁve (Bansal and Yaron 2004 and Bansal 2006 discuss the evidence about η,
Bansal and Yaron focus on η =1 .5); the annual interest rate for the U.S. is below 16%
during 1900-1997, using commercial paper rate for r; and because money receipts are
interpreted as labor income, implying a ≤ 0.6 (Khan and Thomas 2010 and Alvarez et
al. 2009 also interpret money receipts as labor income; I use the same value for a that
they use, a =0 .6). We can, therefore, study the properties of the equilibrium without
the constraint c ≥ aY . This property facilitates the analysis and characterization of
the equilibrium.
The value of ˆ c0 is obtained with the market clearing condition for goods. The




0 ˆ c(t,n)dn +
γ
N =1 . Write the
consumption-income ratio within holding periods as ˆ c(t,n)=ˆ c0e−ηr(t−Tj(n)),f o rt h e
highest j (n) such that Tj (n) ≤ t<T j+1 (n). The market clearing holds for every




0 ˆ c0e−ηr(N−n)dn +
γ










The eﬀect of the transfer cost is apparent in the term γ/N. A sw em u s tt a k e
into account γ/N, the consumption-income ratio can be less than 1 during the entire
holding period. With transfer cost in utility terms, γ/N disappears and ˆ c0 > 1.
The eﬀect of γ through the market clearing condition would not be considered. The
expression of N, given in proposition 1 below, implies N>γ.S o ,ˆ c0 > 0.
The ﬁrst order conditions for Tj (n), j =2 ,3,...,i m p l y























T h el e f th a n ds i d ea n dt h er i g h th a n ds i d ea r et h em a r g i n a lg a i na n dl o s so fd e l a y i n g
Tj. The marginal gain is given ﬁrst by postponing the transfer cost and second by
11decreasing balances from Tj to Tj+1; the third term is the net eﬀect of increasing
[Tj−1,T j) and decreasing [Tj,T j+1),t h i se ﬀect is zero when η =1 . The right hand
side is given by the loss in utility caused by the increase in Tj,a n db yt h en e te ﬀect of
the money receipts within the holding period. We obtain N with (9), r = ρ+g/η+π,
and the expression of ˆ c(t,n).







[ρ − g(1 − 1/η)+r(η − 1)]N
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[r − ρ + g(1 − 1/η)]N
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,f o rη =1 , (11)









. N exists and is unique for
all positive a that satisﬁes ˆ c0e−ηrN ≥ a and all positive values of γ, η, ρ, g,a n dr.
With the value of N,w eﬁnd all optimal trading periods Tj (n), n ∈ [0,N),a s
agents trade at n, n + N and so on. With γ in utility terms, ˆ c0 disappears for a =0
from (10) and (11). As discussed above, ˆ c(t) ≥ a (and so ˆ c0e−ηrN ≥ a)f o rt h e
empirically relevant cases.





2,w h e r ex ≥ 0 in the formulas if η ≥ 1, π ≥ 0,a n dg ≥ 0.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
ρ − g(1 − 1/η)+r(η − 1) = rη − π − g and r − ρ + g(1 − 1/η)=π + g.
Proposition 2 N is such that (i) ∂N
∂r < 0 and (ii) ∂N
∂γ > 0. Moreover, (iii) ∂N
∂a > 0;
(iv) ∂N
∂ρ > 0;( v )∂N
∂η > 0 if g =0 ; ∂N
∂η > 0 if g>0 for η > ηg,w h e r eηg is given in
the proof of the proposition; and (vi) ∂N
∂g < 0 if η > 1 and ∂N
∂g > 0 if η < 1.
12Proposition 2 shows that N decreases with r and increases with γ. In addition, N
increases with a and ρ.W h e ng =0 , N increases with η,a n dw h e ng>0, N increases
with η if η is suﬃciently high, and decreases with η if η is close to zero. The familiar
substitution and income eﬀects are present in the model. They have opposite signs
and cancel each other when η =1 : N increases with g if η < 1, decreases if η > 1,
and g disappears from the formula of N if η =1 .
The parameters that aﬀect N the most are r, γ and a. To see this, make a second-
order expansion of (10). The result is N ≈
p
2γ/(ˆ c0 (N) − a)r.T h eB a u m o l - T o b i n
model assumes a =0and constant c = Y (so ˆ c0 =1 ). In this case, the square-
root formula
p
2γ/r approximates the optimal N. The square-root formula does not
approximate N when a>0.W i t h a =0 .6, for example, and ˆ c0 (N)=1(a good





2γ/r, 60% higher than the square root approximation. Money receipts within
holding periods increase the interval between transfers. For a given a, in any case,
the interest elasticity of N is close to −0.5.
With the value of N, the output growth rate g,a n dt h ef a c tt h a ta g e n t sc o n s u m ea t
the rate −ηr + g within holding periods, we obtain M0 (n) and W0 (n) such that the
economy is in the steady state from t =0and on. The growth rate g is used to write
consumption just after a transfer. The consumption-income ratio ˆ c0 at the beginning
of holding periods after t = T1 (n) is the same for all agents in the steady state. The
value of ˆ c(0,n) diﬀers across agents because the holding period that initiates at t =0
has diﬀerent lengths, according to n ∈ [0,N).W e h a v e c+ (Tj (n),n)=ˆ c0Y0egTj(n):
consumption at the beginning of holding periods grows at the rate g.P r o p o s i t i o n3
gives the values of M0 (n).A sw ed o n ’ tn e e dB0 (n) to discuss the demand for money,
t h ev a l u e so fB0 (n) are in the proof of proposition 3, in the appendix.
Proposition 3 The initial money holdings such that the economy is in a steady state













and N is given
by proposition (1).
An agent with M0 (n) makes transfers at t = n, n+N,a n ds oo n .A sˆ c0e−ηrN >a ,
M0 (n) increases with n. So, agents that make the ﬁrst transfer later have more
initial money holdings. Analogously, the initial value in the brokerage account B0 (n)
decreases with n.I fa na g e n tm a k e st h eﬁrst trade of bonds for money soon (n small),
then B0 (n) is high.
Although the distribution of agents along [0,N) is uniform, with density f (n)= 1
N,
the distribution of individual money holdings is not uniform. As prices and output
grow over time, individual money holdings also grow over time. So, consider the
distribution of individual money-income ratios. The distribution of money-income
ratios is constant over time.
The individual money-income ratio is given by b(n)=
M0(n)
P0Y0 . The individual
money-income ratio is distributed along [0,m H),w h e r emH = limn→N b(n).T h e
density fb(m) of the individual money-income ratios is given by f(b−1(m))
∂b−1(m)
∂m ,
where f (n)= 1
N and b−1 (m) is the value of n such that b(n)=m (as b(n) is in-
c r e a s i n g ,w ea l w a y sh a v eo n ea n dau n i q u ev a l u eo fb−1 (m)). Therefore, fb (m)=
1
N[ηrm + e[r−ρ+g(1−1/η)]b−1(m)(ˆ c0e−ηrN − a)+ηrae(r−ρ+g(1−1/η))b−1(m)−1
[r−ρ+g(1−1/η)] ]−1, m ∈ [0,m H).
The distribution of real money holdings is concentrated on small quantities of money,
but it is close to a uniform. The distribution is more concentrated on small quantities
of money if η increases.2
We obtain the aggregate demand for money with M0 = 1
N
R N
0 M0 (n)dn.T h e
aggregate money-income ratio m(r), the inverse of velocity, is obtained by dividing
2Berentsen et al. (2004) and Santos (2006) obtain other distributions of individual demands for
money.
14M0 by P0Y0. The aggregate money-income ratio is then
m(r)=
ˆ c0 (r,N)e−ηrN










r − ρ + g(1 − 1/η)
∙
e[r−ρ+g(1−1/η)]N − 1
[r − ρ + g(1 − 1/η)]N
− 1
¸
,( 1 2 )









.T h e ﬁrst
term in the expression of m(r) is always positive, as ηrN > [r −ρ+g(1−1/η)]N ⇔
ρ − g(1 − 1/η)+r(η − 1) > 0.N o t i c e t h a t g does not aﬀect the money-income
ratio if η =1 . A fraction a of income received directly as money means, in practice,
that the agents need to hold less money to buy goods. So, m decreases with a.T h e
aggregate money-income ratio is a function of the interest rate r and also of preference
parameters, ﬁnancial technology, and output growth. I write m(r) to emphasize the
relation of the money-income ratio to the interest rate.
Figure 1 shows m(r) and U.S. annual data. I use M1 for money and commercial
paper rate for r, as Lucas (2000), Lagos and Wright (2005) and others (there are
questions about the choice of the proxies for M and r, as pointed out by Teles and
Zhou 2005, I use M1 and commercial paper rate to facilitate comparison with the lit-
erature). A second-order approximation of m(r) yields (e−ηrNˆ c0 −a)N
2 .T h ei n t e r e s t
elasticity of m is, therefore, close to the interest elasticity of N, −0.5. Lucas (2000)
argues that an interest elasticity of −0.5 provides a good ﬁt to the data. Many empir-
ical studies, however, ﬁnd smaller interest elasticities in absolute value, especially for
the short-run. More recently, on the other hand, Alvarez and Lippi (2009) estimate
interest elasticities close to −0.5. The semi-elasticity of m is −12.5,c o m p a t i b l ew i t h
the ﬁndings of Lucas (1988), Stock and Watson (1993), and the long-run elasticities
of Guerron-Quintana (2009).
To calibrate the model, I set the conventional values ρ =1 %p.a., g =2 %p.a. and
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Fig. 1. m(r) and U.S. data, 1900-1997 (M1/(PY) for the money-income ratio and
commercial paper rate for the nominal interest rate, the data points indicate years).
η =1(log utility). I set a =0 .6, as Alvarez et al. (2009) and Khan and Thomas
(2010), who interpret a as labor income. The only parameter left is γ,w h i c hIs e t
to γ =1 .265%. γ is set so that m(r) passes through the historical average of the
data, that is, m(¯ r) equals the historical money-income ratio when ¯ r is the historical
interest rate, obtained with their geometric means. This is the same procedure of
Lucas (2000). Similarly, Alvarez et al. (2009) and Khan and Thomas (2010) calibrate
their models to ﬁt the historical M2 velocity.
γ =1 .265% means that agents in the model spend about 22 minutes per week in
ﬁnancial transfers when inﬂation is equal to 1%. To get this value, notice that γ/N
i st h ec o s to fﬁnancial transfers per year as a fraction of income. When π =1 % ,
proposition 1 implies that N =1 .27. With the average weekly hours from 1957 to
1997 of U.S. workers, equal to 36.5 according to the OECD, the time devoted to
ﬁnancial transfers is then
γ
N × 36.5 × 60 = 22 minutes per week.
16The model implies a large interval between transfers, as common in market seg-
mentation models (Edmond and Weill 2008). With π =1 % , g =2 % ,a n da =0 ,t h e
model implies N of about 6 months. N increases to 1.27 year when a =0 .6.A l v a r e z
et al. (2009), for example, set the transfer interval from 1.5 to 3 years (larger inter-
vals because they use M2). Financial transfers both here and in Alvarez et al. are
transfers from high-yielding assets to currency, not ATM withdrawals, which change
the allocations of checking deposits and currency, but do not change the quantity of
money. Although large, the transfer intervals agree with the low trading frequency of
households (Vissing-Jorgensen 2002, Alvarez et al. 2009) and the large cash holdings
of ﬁrms (Bates et al. 2009). Notice that agents in the model represent households
and ﬁrms, as 62% of M1 in the U.S. is held by ﬁrms (Bover and Watson 2005). Silva
(forthcoming) discusses the calibration in more detail and compares m(r) with a =0
or 0.6, N ﬁxed or optimal, and diﬀerent η’s.
Is i m p l i ﬁed the model to facilitate its application: the objective is to create a
framework to study changes in monetary policy taking into account the frictions
to manage money holdings and a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings. In
particular, m(r) is stable with constant γ and constant ﬁnancial market participation.
Following Reynard (2004) we can obtain a stable m(r) with decreasing γ (ﬁnancial
innovation) together with increasing ﬁnancial market participation. It simpliﬁes,
however, to have constant γ and ﬁnancial market participation. As ﬁgure 1 shows,
these assumptions imply a close match with the data. Another simpliﬁcation is to
impose that agents need money to buy goods through a cash-in-advance constraint
i n s t e a do fo b t a i n i n gad e m a n df o rm o n e yf r o mm a t c h i n ga si nK i y o t a k ia n dW r i g h t
(1989), Rocheteau and Wright (2005), and Lagos and Wright (2005). Moreover,
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Ireland (2009) point out that the demand
for money changes with low interest rates. The model is intended to be used with
moderate interest rates, in the range of the interest rates of ﬁgure 1, for which m(r)
17follow the general pattern of the data.












S (t)dt,( 1 3 )
where G is government consumption and τ is a lump-sum tax. The total supply of
g o v e r n m e n tb o n d si ss t i l lg i v e nb yB0 = 1
N
R
B0 (n)dn. With lump-sum taxes and a as
the fraction in money of gross income, each agent transfers to the brokerage account
R ∞
0 Q(t)[P (t)(1− a)Y (t) − τ]dt at each time. According to (13), if revenues from
seigniorage are zero, for example, then B0 =
R ∞
0 Q(t)[τ − P (t)G]dt,w h i c hm e a n s
that net government revenues are rebated to agents through government bonds.
Diﬀerent ways of ﬁnancing government consumption, therefore, aﬀect the economy
in diﬀerent ways. A higher G ﬁnanced with an increase in τ decreases consumption
to satisfy the market clearing condition for goods, but does not change the frequency
of trading bonds for money. According to (13), this is done by making the increase in
τ equal to the increase in G so that ˙ MS (t) does not change. As
˙ M
M = π +g,i n ﬂation
and the decision on N do not change.
On the other hand, an increase in G ﬁnanced with seigniorage increases inﬂation.
The change in inﬂation implies an additional decrease in consumption because the
frequency of trading increases and so the resources devoted to ﬁnancial transactions
increase. In a model with ﬁxed N, ﬁnancing G with taxes or seigniorage would yield
similar results. Seigniorage would still increase inﬂation, but the eﬀect on consump-
tion would be restricted to consumption smoothing within holding periods. Here, the
increase in the frequency of trades further aﬀects consumption.
183. Conclusions
This paper introduces a model to study how changes in monetary policy such as
changes in the interest rate or in the money supply aﬀect prices and the real demand
for money. The distribution of money holdings, prices, interest rates, production and
government actions are consistent in equilibrium. That is, they are consistent with
market clearing conditions, budget constraints and individual maximization.
The model combines the Baumol-Tobin general equilibrium frameworks of Jo-
vanovic (1982) and Romer (1986) with the market segmentation models of Grossman
and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984). The result is a cash-in-advance model in
which the length of the time period is optimal and money holdings are heterogeneous.
Some applications of the model are to study how changes in the trading frequency
aﬀect the demand for money and the welfare cost of inﬂation. Taking into account
the changes in the trading frequency, Silva (forthcoming) shows that the estimates of
the welfare cost of inﬂation increase substantially. More generally, the model is useful
to study how the adjustment of money holdings aﬀects real variables.
Appendix - Proofs
I will use the following functions and deﬁnitions in propositions 1, 2 and 3: f (x)=
1−e−x
x , ˆ ρ ≡ ρ − g(1 − 1/η), x1 ≡ r(η − 1)N, x2 ≡ x1 +ˆ ρN, g(y)=ey−1
y , y1 =
rN, y2 = y1 − ˆ ρN. ˆ ρ > 0 by assumption to imply a bounded solution for the
maximization problem, so x2 >x 1 and y1 >y 2.M o r e o v e r ,g is increasing and convex
and so [g(y1) − g(y2)] > 0 and [g0 (y1) − g0 (y2)] > 0,a sy1 >y 2. Similarly, f is
decreasing and convex and so [f (x1) − f (x2)] > 0 and [f0 (x1) − f0 (x2)] < 0,a s
x1 <x 2.L e tG be deﬁned by G(N)=ˆ c0 (N)rN[f (x1)−f (x2)]−ˆ ργ −z (N),w h e r e
z (N)=arN[g(y1) − g(y2)].T h eo p t i m a li n t e r v a lN∗ is such that G(N∗)=0 .
Proposition 1. Proof. The ﬁrst order conditions for Tj, j =2 , 3,o fa g e n tn are
19e−ρTju(c− (Tj)) − e−ρTju(c+ (Tj)) − λ[ ˙ Q(Tj)
R Tj+1
Tj P (t)c(t)dt + Q(Tj)P (Tj)c+ (Tj)
−Q(Tj−1)P (Tj)c− (Tj)+ ˙ Q(Tj)
R Tj+1
Tj aP (t)Ye gtdt−Ye gTjP (Tj)a(Q(Tj)−Q(Tj−1))
−γYe gTj(P (Tj) ˙ Q(Tj)+Q(Tj) ˙ P (Tj)) − Y γgegTjP (Tj)Q(Tj)] = 0.T h eﬁrst order
conditions for consumption yield e−ρTjc− (Tj)
−1/η = λQ(Tj−1)P (Tj) and e−ρTj ×
c+ (Tj)
−1/η = λQ(Tj)P (Tj). In the steady state, Q(t)=e−rt and P (t)=P0eπt,
Nj = N,a n dc(t)=ˆ c(t)Y0egt. Substituting and simplifying yields γ(r − π − g)+
£















erN).M o r e o v e r , ˆ c(t)=ˆ c0e−ηr(t−Tj), ˆ c+ (Tj)=ˆ c0,a n derNˆ c− (Tj)=e−r(η−1)Nˆ c0.




Tj e(g+π−ηr)(t−Tj)dt =( r −π −g)γ +a(erN −
1) − ra
R Tj+1
Tj e(g+π)(t−Tj)dt. Solving the integrals and rearranging yields (10). Note
that r = ρ + g/η + π. The steps for η =1are analogous.
For existence and uniqueness, the strategy is to show that G is increasing in N,w i t h
limN→γ G(N) < 0 and limN→+∞G(N) > 0. These three properties of G imply that
N∗ exists and is unique. Moreover N∗ > γ.W eh a v eG(r,N)=ˆ c0 (N)[1−e−r(η−1)N
η−1 −
r1−e−[ˆ ρ+r(η−1)]N
ˆ ρ+r(η−1) ] − ˆ ργ − a[erN − 1 − re(r−ˆ ρ)N−1
r−ˆ ρ ] and so GN =ˆ c0NrN[f (x1) − f (x2)] +
rerN(1 − e−ˆ ρN)[ˆ c0 (N)e−ηrN − a].I f a =0then, as ˆ c0N ≡ ∂ˆ c0 (N)/∂N>0,w e
have GN > 0.I f a>0 then a suﬃcient condition for GN > 0 is ˆ c0 (N)e−ηrN ≥ a.
That is, consumption in the end of a holding period is higher than or equal to the
money receipts. This condition is satisﬁed because of the constraint c(t,n) ≥ aY (t).
As discussed in the text, in any case, we always have c(t,n) >a Y(t), nonbinding,
for the empirically relevant parameters. For η =1 , analogously, GN > 0.F o r t h e
limits, we have limN→+γ GN (N) ≤− ˆ ργ for all η > 0, with equality if and only if
a =0 .S o , limN→+γ GN (N) < 0.F i n a l l y , limN→+∞ GN (N) > 0 for all η > 0.
Therefore, limN→+∞G(N)=+ ∞. (Eventually, the constraint ˆ c(t) ≥ a binds, as
limN→+∞ ˆ c0 (N)e−ηrN =0 ; we still have in this case that limN→+∞G(N)=+ ∞.)
Therefore, G crosses the zero and, as it is increasing, it crosses the zero only once.
The unique N∗ is such that G(N∗)=0 .¥




each property, where G is deﬁned above and Gx denotes ∂G/∂x.I np r o p o s i t i o n1 ,w e
already proved that GN > 0.
(i) ∂N
∂r < 0. We have to show that Gr(N∗) > 0.C o n s i d e r ﬁrst the case a =0 .
We have Gr =ˆ c0N [f (x1) − f (x2)]h(x1),u s i n gˆ c0r = −ˆ c0
f0(rηN)
f(rηN) ηN,a n dw h e r e
h(x1)=1−rηN
f0(rηN)
f(rηN) +r(η − 1)N
f0(x2)−f0(x1)
f(x2)−f(x1) .I fη < 1, all terms in the expression
of h(x1) are positive and so Gr > 0 (recall that f0 < 0, f0 (x2) − f0 (x1) > 0 and
f (x2) − f (x1) < 0). The same reasoning applies for η =1 .F o rη > 1,n o t i c et h a t





x>0. The function x
f0(x)













f0(x),w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e
for all x. As a result, Gr > 0.
When a>0,w eh a v eGr =ˆ c0N [f (x1) − f (x2)]h(x1) − zr (N),w h e r ezr (N) >
0. Substituting the deﬁnition of z (N),w eo b t a i nt h a tGr > 0 if and only if a<
ˆ c0[f(x1)−f(x2)]h(x1)
[g(y1)−g(y2)]+rN[g0(y1)−g0(y2)].I np r a c t i c e( f o ra ≤ 0.6 and the standard values for η and
r, for example), this condition is always satisﬁed and so Gr > 0.
(ii) ∂N
∂γ > 0. Gγ = −r
f(x1)−f(x2)]
f(rηN) − ˆ ρ < 0.
(iii) ∂N
∂a > 0. Ga = −rN[g(y1) − g(y2)] < 0.
(iv) ∂N
∂ρ > 0.I ts u ﬃces to show that Gˆ ρ < 0,a sˆ ρ = ρ−g(1 − 1/η).W eh a v eGˆ ρ =
−ˆ c0rN2f0 (x2)−γ−arN2g0 (y2).F o ra =0 , Gˆ ρ (N∗) < 0 if ˆ c0rN2f0 (x2) > −γ at N∗,
which is true because −γ =ˆ c0rN2 f(x2)−f(x1)
ˆ ρN when N = N∗,a n df0 (x2) >
f(x2)−f(x1)
ˆ ρN ,
as f is convex. Therefore, Gˆ ρ < 0.W h e na increases, Gˆ ρ decreases as the ﬁrst order
eﬀect on Gˆ ρ is −rN2g0 (y2) < 0 (the eﬀect of N on Gˆ ρ, caused by the increase in a,i s
s m a l lc o m p a r e dw i t ht h eﬁrst order eﬀect of a). Therefore, Gˆ ρ (N∗) is also negative
for a>0.
(v) ∂N
∂η > 0. W eh a v et op r o v et h a tGη < 0.F o r g =0 , Gη =ˆ c0 (rN)
2 [f (x1) −
f (x2)]h(x1),u s i n gˆ c0η = −ˆ c0
f0(rηN)




























f(x) is increasing. So, h(x) < 0 and Gη < 0.I fr<ρ,u s et h ef a c tt h a t
f0(y)−f0(x)











f(x+rN) < 0 as
f0(x)
f(x) is increasing. So, h(x) < 0 and Gη < 0.
When g>0,w eh a v eGη =ˆ c0 (rN)
2 h(x1)+rN
gN
η2 ˆ c0[f0 (x2) −
f(x2)−f(x1)
ˆ ρN ] for a =0
(the idea is similar for a>0). The second term in the right in positive because
f0 (x2) >
f(x2)−f(x1)





=0 .T h e r e f o r e ,Gη < 0 if and only if η > ηg.
(vi) ∂N
∂g < 0 if η > 1 and ∂N
∂g > 0 if η < 1. The only term in which g appears is
ˆ ρ = ρ − g(1 − 1/η), ∂N/∂ˆ ρ > 0.A s∂ˆ ρ/∂g = −(η − 1)/η, ∂N/∂g has the same sign
of ∂N/∂ˆ ρ if η < 1 and the opposite sign if η > 1 (g disappears from the formula of
N if η =1 ).¥
Proposition 3. Proof. M0 (n) is such that agent n consumes at the steady state




0 aP (t)Y0egtdt.A g e n tn =0
consumes c0 at time t =0 . Given that the consumption growth rate within N in the
steady state is equal to −(ηr − g), and that consumption just after a transfer grows
at the rate g, an arbitrary agent n consumes c0e−ηr(N−n) at t =0 . That is, agent n




c0e−ηr(N−n) at t =0 .T h e r e f o r e , c(t,n)=c0e−ηr(N−n)e−(ηr−g)t, 0 ≤ t<n .M o r e -
over, P (t)=P0eπt in the steady state. Substituting above and solving the inte-
g r a l sy i e l d st h ev a l u eo fM0 (n) in the body of the text. For W0,l e tW0 (n) ≡
R ∞





j=1 Q(Tj)P (Tj)γY (t), equal to the present value of future trans-
fers plus transfer costs. The quantity of money needed in each holding period




Tj(n) aP (t)Y (t)dt,w i t hc(t,n)=
22c0egTj(n)e−(ηr−g)(t−Tj) and Tj (n)=n +( j − 1)N. Substituting and solving yields
P∞
j=1 Q(Tj)M+ (Tj (n)) = P0Y0Ne−(ρ−g(1−1/η))n
1−e−(ρ−g(1−1/η))N [ˆ c0f (x2) − ag (y2)]. Similarly, we have
P∞
j=1 Q(Tj)P (Tj)γY (t)=
P0Y0γe−(ρ−g(1−1/η))n
1−e−(ρ−g(1−1/η))N . Initial bond holdings B0 (n) can then
be obtained with the deﬁnition of W0 (n).¥
References
Alvarez, Fernando, Andrew Atkeson, and Chris Edmond (2009). “Sluggish
Responses of Prices and Inﬂa t i o nt oM o n e t a r yS h o c k si na nI n v e n t o r yM o d e lo fM o n e y
Demand.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3): 911-967.
Alvarez, Fernando, Andrew Atkeson, and Patrick J. Kehoe (2002). “Money,
Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates with Endogenously Segmented Markets.” Journal
of Political Economy, 110(1): 73-112.
Alvarez, Fernando, and Francesco Lippi (2009). “Financial Innovation and
the Transactions Demand for Cash.” Econometrica, 77(2): 363-402.
Bates, Thomas W., Kathleen M. Kahle, and Rene M. Stulz (2009). “Why
Do U.S. Firms Hold so Much More Cash than They Used to?” Journal of Finance,
64(5): 1985-2021.
Bansal, Ravi, and Amir Yaron (2004). “Risks for the Long Run: A Potential
Resolution of Asset Pricing Puzzles.” Journal of Finance, 59(4): 1481-1509.
Bansal, Ravi (2006). “Long Run Risks and Risk Compensation in Equity Mar-
kets.” In R. Mehra (ed.), Handbook of Investments: Equity Risk Premium.N o r t h
Holland: Amsterdam.
Baumol, William J. (1952). “The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory
Theoretic Approach.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 66(4): 545-556.
Berentsen, Aleksander, Gabriele Camera and Christopher Waller (2004).
“The Distribution of Money and Prices in an Equilibrium with Lotteries.” Economic
Theory, 24: 887-906.
23Bover, Olympia, and Nadine Watson (2005). “Are There Economies of Scale in
the Demand for Money by Firms? Some Panel Data Estimates.” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 52(8): 1569-1589.
Chiu, Jonathan (2007). “Endogenously Segmented Asset Market in an Inventory
Theoretic Model of Money Demand.” Bank of Canada Working Paper 2007-46.
Edmond, Chris, and Pierre-Olivier Weill (2008). “Models of the Liquidity
Eﬀect.” In S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics, 2nd Edition. Palgrave Macmillan.
Fusselman, Jerry and Sanford J. Grossman (1989). “Monetary Dynamics with
Fixed Transaction Costs.” Princeton University Working Paper.
Grossman, Sanford J. (1985). “Monetary Dynamics with Proportional Trans-
action Costs and Fixed Payment Periods.” National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper 1663.
Grossman, Sanford J. (1987). “Monetary Dynamics with Proportional Transac-
tion Costs and Fixed Payment Periods.” In New Approaches to Monetary Economics,
ed. W. Barnett, and K. Singleton, 3-41. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Grossman, Sanford J. and Laurence Weiss (1983). “A Transactions-Based
Model of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism.” American Economic Review, 73(5):
871-880.
Guerron-Quintana, Pablo A. (2009). “Money Demand Heterogeneity and the
Great Moderation.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(2): 255-266.
Heathcote, Jonathan (1998). “Interest Rates in a General Equilibrium Baumol-
Tobin Model.” Working Paper.
Ireland, Peter N. (2009). “On the Welfare Cost of Inﬂation and the Recent
Behavior of Money Demand.” American Economic Review, 99(3): 1040-1052.
Jovanovic, Boyan (1982). “Inﬂation and Welfare in the Steady State.” Journal of
Political Economy, 90(3): 561-577.
24Karni, Edi (1973). “The Transactions Demand for Cash: Incorporation of the
Value of Time into the Inventory Approach.” Journal of Political Economy, 81(5):
1216-1225.
Khan, Aubhik, and Julia K. Thomas (2010). “Inﬂation and Interest Rates with
Endogenous Market Segmentation.” Working Paper.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and Randall Wright (1989). “Money as a Medium of
Exchange.” J o u r n a lo fP o l i t i c a lE c o n o m y , 97(4): 927-954.
Lagos, Ricardo, and Randall Wright (2005). “A Uniﬁed Framework for Mone-
tary Theory and Policy Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy, 113(3): 463-484.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1988). “Money Demand in the United States: a Quanti-
tative Review.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 29: 137-168.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1990). “Liquidity and Interest Rates.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 50: 237-264.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (2000). “Inﬂation and Welfare.” Econometrica, 68(2):
247-274.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. and Nancy Stokey (1987). “Money and Interest in a
Cash-in-Advance Economy.” Econometrica, 55(3): 491-513.
Meltzer, Allan H. (1963). “The Demand for Money: Evidence from the Time
Series.” Journal of Political Economy, 71(3): 219-246.
Mulligan, Casey B., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2000). “Extensive Margins
and the Demand for Money at Low Interest Rates.” Journal of Political Economy,
108(5): 961-991.
Reynard, Samuel (2004). “Financial Market Participation and the Apparent In-
stability of Money Demand.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(6): 1297-1317.
Rocheteau, Guillaume, and Randall Wright (2005). “Money in Search Equi-
librium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium.” Econo-
metrica, 73(1): 175-202.
25Rodriguez-Mendizabal, Hugo (2006). “The Behavior of Money Velocity in High
and Low Inﬂation Countries.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38(1): 209-228.
Romer, David (1986). “A Simple General Equilibrium Version of the Baumol-
Tobin Model.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(4): 663-686.
Rotemberg, Julio J. (1984). “A Monetary Equilibrium Model with Transactions
Costs.” Journal of Political Economy, 92(1): 40-58.
Santos, Manuel S. (2006). “The Value of Money in a Dynamic Equilibrium
Model.” Economic Theory, 27(1): 39-58.
Silva, Andre C. (2009). “Prices and Money after Interest Rate Shocks with En-
dogenous Market Segmentation.” Working Paper.
Silva, Andre C. (forthcoming). “Rebalancing Frequency and the Welfare Cost of
Inﬂation.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.
Stock, J., and Watson, M. (1993). “A Simple Estimator of Cointegrating Vectors
in Higher Order Integrated Systems.” Econometrica, 61(4): 783-820.
Teles, Pedro, and Ruilin Zhou (2005). “A Stable Money Demand: Looking
for the Right Monetary Aggregate.” Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, 29(1st Quarter): 50-63.
Tobin, James (1956). “The Interest-Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for
Cash.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 38(3): 241-247.
26